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Market efficiency is analysed for the Iberian Power Futures Market and other European Power Markets, 
as well as other fuel markets through evaluation of ex-post Forward Risk Premium. The equilibrium 
price from compulsory call auctions for distribution companies within the framework of the Iberian 
Power Futures Market is not optimal for remuneration purposes as it seems to be slightly upward 
biased. In the period considered (August 2006-July 2008), monthly futures contracts behave similarly to 
quarterly contracts. Average risk premia have been positive in power and natural gas markets but 
negative in oil and coal markets. Different hypotheses are tested regarding increasing volatility with 
maturity and regarding Forward Risk Premium variations (decreasing with variance of spot prices 
during delivery period and increasing with skewness of spot prices during delivery period). Enlarged 
data sets are recommended for stronger test results. Energy markets tend to show limited levels of 
market efficiency. Regarding the emerging Iberian Power Futures Market, price efficiency is improved 
with market development of all the coexistent forward contracting mechanisms and with further 
integration of European Regional Electricity Markets. 
1. Introduction 
Since its beginning in July 2006, the Iberian Power Futures 
Market managed by Iberian Forward Market Operator (OMIP), 
within the framework of the Iberian Electricity Market (MIBEL), 
has experienced a continuous development, in terms of number of 
participants and liquidity. At this moment, around 30 market 
players participate in OMIP. Almost half of them (12) belong to 
Iberian energy incumbents (vertically integrated energy groups 
with separated generation and distribution companies). Only six 
members are pure financial agents, still a reduced figure. 
Additionally, only two market makers have been active in OMIP: 
RBS Sempra quoting monthly contracts in the periods September 
2007-March 2008 and May 2008-October 2008, and EGL Spain 
quoting quarterly and yearly contracts in the period November 
2008-April 2008. The main amount of traded energy in OMIP is 
still driven by compulsory call auctions according to national 
regulations aimed at fostering the MIBEL. The Spanish distribution 
companies and the Portuguese last resort supplier with more than 
100,000 clients are obliged to purchase in these auctions, in order 
to partly cover their portfolios of end-user-regulated supplies. 
Such an obligation comprises 5% of their regulated supplies, for 
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the 2nd half of year 2006, as agreed by MIBEL Council of 
Regulators in the Evora Summit (November 2005), and published 
in the corresponding legislation (Spanish Order ITC/2129/2006 
and Portuguese "Portaria" 643/2006), and 10% for year 2007 
onwards, as agreed in the Badajoz Summit (November 2006), and 
published in Spanish Order ITC/3990/2006 and Portuguese 
Dispatch 780/2007 (for 1st half of year 2007), Spanish Order 
ITC/1865/2007 and Portuguese Dispatch /2007 of 29 June, 2007 
(for 2nd half of year 2007 and 1st half of year 2008), Spanish 
Order ITC/1934/2008 and Portuguese Dispatch 19098/2008 (for 
2nd half of year 2008), and Spanish Order ITC/3789/2008 and 
Portuguese Dispatch 125-A/2009 (for 1st half of year 2009) 
(Fernández Domínguez and Xiberta Bernat, 2007; Capitán Herráiz 
and Rodriguez Monroy, 2009). 
As shown in Fig. 1, since the last quarter of 2007 the amount of 
energy traded in the OMIP continuous market has grown slightly 
compared to previous trading levels, with a record in June 2008, 
though it is still less than the auctioned amounts. In the first two 
years of OMIP continuous market (i.e., since July 2006 until July 
2008), the accumulated amount of energy traded in OMIP call 
auctions is more than five times bigger than in the continuous 
market. Within the first two years of OMIP, despite the record level in 
June 2008, no generalised trend of increasing volumes is appreciated 
in the continuous market. Therefore, liquidity of this market is still 
reduced compared to other European Power Futures Markets. 
An analysis of the efficiency of the Iberian Power Futures 
Market is done to assess the situation of this emerging market. 
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Fig. 1. Evolution of trading levels (GWh) in OMIP call auctions and OMIP continuous market. 
This information is of special interest both for all MIBEL market 
players and for MIBEL Regulatory Committee in charge of MIBEL 
market supervision. In order to perform this analysis, the article is 
structured as follows: Section 2 Iberian Power Futures Market 
describes how OMIP call auctions and OMIP continuous market 
work, as well as other coexisting forward contracting mechanisms 
within MIBEL scope, namely, the so-called EPE auctions (in 
Spanish "Emisiones Primarias de Energía", commonly known in 
English as virtual power plant (VPP) auctions) and CESUR auctions 
(in Spanish "Contratos de Energía para Suministros de Último 
Recurso", i.e., last resort supply auctions); Section 3 Literature 
Review about Market Efficiency briefly describes the main studies 
regarding price efficiency of energy and other commodity 
markets; Section 4 Definition of the Ex-post Forward Risk Premium, 
builds that premium as the difference between the average 
settlement price of a futures contract and the resulting average 
spot price during delivery (e.g., Furió and Meneu, 2009), and 
constitutes it as the driver of the diverse tests performed in the 
following Sections; Section 5 Test I Assessment of OMIP Auction 
Equilibrium Prices assesses if the price formation in OMIP call 
auctions is satisfactory; Section 6 Test 2 Analysis of Basic Statistics 
of Futures & Spot Prices compares the price evolution of various 
energy markets; Section 7 Test 3 Analysis of Ex-post Forward Risk 
Premium magnitudes assesses the Forward Risk Premium existence 
and compares the futures behaviour towards maturity of these 
energy markets; Section 8 Test 4 Bessembinder's and Lemmon's 
hypothesis compliance analyses the compliance of OMIP, Power-
next and Nord Pool Power Markets regarding the hypothesis 
derived from seminal research based upon an equilibrium model 
by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002), claiming that the Forward 
Risk Premium decreases in the variance of spot prices and 
increases in the skewness of wholesale prices; finally, Section 9 
Conclusions summarises the findings of this research and proposes 
future developments related to this topic. 
2. Iberian power futures market 
Since November 18th, 2008, the Iberian Power Futures Market 
has the EU Regulated Market status, according to Directive 2004/ 
39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 21st, 
2004 on markets in financial instruments (MiFID), following the 
registration with the Portugese Securities Market Commission 
(Comissao do Mercado de Valores Mobiliarios, CMVM) on October 
30th, 2008. Whereas OMIP works as Market Operator of the 
MIBEL Derivatives Market, OMIClear acts as the Clearinghouse. 
There are two trading modes coexisting within OMIP: the 
continuous market (default mode) and the call auction. In the 
continuous trading, anonymous buy and sell orders interact 
immediately and individually with opposite side orders, generat-
ing trades with an undetermined number of prices for each 
contract. Buy orders with the highest prices and sell orders with 
the lowest prices are executed first. In the call auction trading, a 
single-price auction maximizes the traded volume, being all 
trades settled at the same price (equilibrium price). The call 
auction algorithm is based on the maximum tradable volume and 
minimum price criteria, following a First In First Out allocation 
method. Additionally, OMIP trading members may settle Over The 
Counter (OTC) trades through OMIClear, either registrating their 
transactions by themselves or through a broker, experiencing this 
activity a remarkable growth in the last quarter of year 2008 due 
to the difficulties of holding credit lines in the current global 
financial turmoil. OMIP trading sessions are composed of the 
following time windows: pre-trade phase happens between 8 a.m. 
and 9 a.m.; auction phase between 9 a.m. and 9:10 a.m.; 
continuous trading phase between 9:10 a.m. and 4:30 p.m.; and 
pre-close phase between 4:30 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. The first four 
Wednesdays of each month, the auction phase is extended until 
10 a.m. as the compulsory call auctions where Spanish distribu-
tion companies and the Portuguese last resort supplier are to 
purchase regulatorily fixed volumes occur (OMIP OMIClear, 2008). 
As stated by Martín Martinez and Villaplana (2009), the 
current regulatory development in Spain and Portugal towards 
the establishment of last resort tariffs competing with the 
liberalised market will foster the electricity derivatives use as 
hedging instruments for the market players. In this sense, since 
June 2007 other forward contracting mechanisms based on 
compulsory auctions have been created, namely: virtual power 
plant auctions (in Spanish, the so-called "Emisiones Primarias de 
Energía" or EPE auctions), and the last resort supply auctions (in 
Spanish, the so-called "Contratos de Energía para Suministros de 
Último Recurso" or CESUR auctions). The coexistence of these 
instruments is boosting the liquidity of energy derivatives for risk 
management purposes, both within OMIP market as well as in the 
OTC market, the latter already active since 1999. The Royal Decree 
1634/2006, of 29 December, established the five first EPE auctions 
with physical delivery. In these auctions, call options regarding 
"virtual" capacity of the Spanish incumbent generators (Endesa 
and Iberdrola) are auctioned following a multi-round ascending 
clock algorithm in order to mitigate market power, as previously 
done in other European and North American markets. The 
successful bidders pay the option price and are thus granted with 
the right to access to this power capacity. When the option 
expires, if the successful bidder wants to execute the option, he 
pays for the strike price that was previously fixed as these options 
are of European nature. These electronic auctions are regulated by 
the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Commerce (MITyC), super-
vised by the Spanish Energy Regulator (Comisión Nacional de 
Energía or CNE), and managed by and independent entity. The 
equilibrium price is got when the demand equals the targeted 
volume at a price bigger than the reserve price. The Royal Decree 
324/2008, of 29 February, establishes a calendar for the sixth and 
seventh EPE auctions, in this case both settled by differences, 
being celebrated in September 2008 and March 2009. On the 
other hand, the CESUR auctions are a forward contracting 
mechanism for the Spanish distribution companies and the 
Portuguese last resort supplier, complementing their procure-
ments in the OMIP call auctions as well as in the spot market. The 
CESUR auctions have facilitated the entry of new agents and foster 
the development of the coexisting forward contracting mechan-
isms. The CESUR auctions, as stated in Order ITC/400/2007, of 26 
February, will contribute to the price valuation of the energy 
included in the last resort tariffs, and will prevent further 
undesirable regulated tariff deficits. The CESUR auctions are also 
regulated by MITyC, supervised by CNE, and managed by an 
independent entity. They are also electronic though based on a 
multi-round descending clock algorithm. In CESUR auctions, the 
equilibrium prices are got when the demand equals the targeted 
volume. Extensive analysis of the celebrated EPE and CESUR 
auctions is provided by Federico and Vives (2008). They conclude 
that the EPE dimension (i.e., the offered capacity by the 
incumbents) is still limited and these auctions have dealt so far 
short-duration contracts, thus rendering relatively ineffective 
regarding market power reduction goals. They also conclude that 
CESUR auctions are unlikely to have a strong pro-competitive 
impact in the market, as there is no obligation to participate. 
Nevertheless, they think that the introduction of longer contracts 
in CESUR auctions would improve the price valuation of the 
energy component of the last resort tariff. 
3. Literature review about market efficiency 
A short literature review of market efficiency is provided, 
focused on energy markets, and especially, in power markets 
compared to other commodities and to other financial markets. 
Market efficiency mainly refers in this context about how well the 
future price predicts the spot price. 
Co-integration tests as well as tests for measuring if the 
forward price is an unbiased forecast for cash price for commodity 
and power markets show that futures markets are efficient in the 
long term, but not in the short term, even if risk neutrality is 
neglected and a risk premium is assumed. In practice, the 
hypothesis claiming that forward price is an unbiased forecast 
of future cash price ("Efficient Market Hypothesis") is usually 
rejected (Engel, 1996). 
According to statistics and econometric research, many 
commodity futures markets existing since the middle of the 
19th century are not efficient. Power markets are considerably 
younger than commodity markets due to the deregulation trend 
in the 1990s. Power markets differ from other markets since 
electricity storage is very limited. There are many studies for the 
US and European Power Markets, analysing the behaviour and 
interactions of their different regional markets. 
Regarding energy markets, Serletis (1992) examines the effects 
of maturity on futures price volatility and trading volume for 129 
energy futures contracts traded in New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX) in the beginning of the 1990s. The results provide 
support for the maturity effect hypothesis theoretically demon-
strated by Samuelson (1965). In the applied Serletis' research, 
energy futures prices become more volatile and trading volume 
increases as futures contracts approach maturity. 
Regarding US Power Markets, there are many studies compar-
ing different regional markets. Arciniegas et al. (2003) detects that 
the Pennsylvania/New Jersey/Maryland (PJM) Power Market and 
the California Power Market are more efficient than the New York 
Power Market. Avsar and Goss (2001) study market efficiency for 
the PJM and the California Power Markets and cannot reject the 
efficient market hypothesis for the period July 1998-March 1999, 
but cannot accept it for the whole data period. They find 
remarkable learning effects from market agents. Additionally, 
market efficiency is linked to market maturity. In this sense, 
market players in power markets seem to learn faster than in oil 
markets, for instance, increasing its efficiency with time (Walls, 
1999). Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) consider that electricity 
cannot be economically stored and therefore, arbitrage-based 
methods are not applicable for pricing power derivative contracts. 
They build an equilibrium model implying that the forward power 
price is a downward-biased predictor of the future spot price if 
expected power demand is low and demand risk is moderate. The 
equilibrium forward risk premium, understood as the bias in the 
forward price as a predictor of the delivery-date spot price, 
increases when either expected demand or demand variance is 
high, due to positive skewness induced in the spot power price 
distribution. Optimal forward positions for power producing and 
retailing firms depend on forecast power demand and on 
skewness of power prices. Premium in forward power prices is 
positively related to expected demand, and is large during 
summer. Longstaff and Wang (2004) perform an empirical 
analysis of forward prices in PJM power market with hourly data 
set of spot and day-ahead forward prices. They find remarkable 
Forward Risk Premia in power prices and obtain results consistent 
with Bessembinder's and Lemmon's model. They find that premia 
vary systematically through the day and are related to agents' 
measures of economic risk (volatility of unexpected changes in 
demand, spot prices, and total revenues). They conclude that PJM 
forward prices are determined rationally by risk-averse economic 
agents, not applying such finding to other power markets more 
exposed to market abuse. Ullrich (2007) streamlines Bessembin-
der's and Lemmon's model considering the constrained capacity, 
allowing the model to reproduce price spikes by using reasonable 
parameter values. He finds that the Forward Risk Premium 
decreases/increases in spot price variance when the expected 
spot price is low (i.e., less than the retail price)/high (bigger than 
the retail price), because of retailers' hedging needs. The enlarged 
PJM data set from Longstaffs and Wang's empirical research 
supports these model predictions. 
Regarding European Power Markets, the largest number of 
studies exists for Nord Pool, the most developed power market in 
Europe since its foundation in 1993 (e.g., Bystróm, 2003). Bystróm 
concludes that traditional simple price hedging models are almost 
equally efficient as the most advanced ones. Therefore, hedging at 
Nord Pool (or whatever power futures market) does not request 
more advanced models than from other financial markets though 
underlying product features differ noticeably from other financial 
or commodities products. The researches regarding European 
markets are usually focused on the regional integration of the 
power markets (e.g., Armstrong and Galli, 2005; Zachmann, 
2005). Armstrong and Galli study European wholesale spot power 
prices and detect a price convergence between the price 
differences. Zachmann also finds a price convergence during the 
2002-2004 period between Dutch and German wholesale power 
prices but not between East Danish and German prices. He 
concludes that it is necessary to overcome the bottlenecks in the 
physical interconnection capacity in order to achieve an integra-
tion of the European Power Market. Regarding research focused 
on the Forward Risk Premium, Karakatsani and Bunn (2005) 
classify half-hourly trading periods in two clusters (peak and off-
peak) discovering a systematic diurnal reversal in the forward 
premium nature for the British Power Market after the market 
reforms in year 2001. The reversal can be explained by the 
asymmetric positions of generators and suppliers towards risk 
and its intra-day variation, due to the heterogeneity of the power-
generation mix and to market design specificity (introduction of 
penal balancing prices and abolishment of capacity payments and 
uniform pricing). Ex-ante forward premia, built upon predictive 
intervals and based on expected spot prices, are similar to ex-post 
premia but sensitive to assumptions on agents' spot price model, 
information set and learning scheme. Cartea and Villaplana 
(2008) build a model for wholesale power prices explained by 
two state variables (demand and capacity) and calculate the 
forward premium. They perform empirical research embracing 
PJM, England and Wales, and Nord Pool markets. They find that, 
depending on the market and the period under study, the 
volatility of capacity and the market price of capacity risk could 
either put upward or downward pressure on forward prices. They 
also find that the forward premium follows a seasonal pattern, 
being positive in the months of high volatility of demand and 
close to zero or even negative in the months of low volatility of 
demand. Furió and Meneu (2009) perform theoretical and 
empirical research (based on OTC prompt month forward prices 
and spot prices of the Spanish Power Market) and find that the ex-
ante forward premium varies with the expected demand in tight 
market conditions, and the ex-post forward premium depends on 
the unexpected variations in demand and hydro capacity. They 
also find a positive relation between the Spanish spot prices and 
the C02 emission allowance prices. The implications derived from 
Bessembinder's and Lemmon's model are supported by their data. 
Conclusions from existing studies measuring the efficiency of 
futures markets vary considerably. Reviewed literature shows no 
uniformity regarding the results provided by the existing 
measuring methods. The selected method can slightly bias the 
results. Additionally, the most advanced models may question 
previous results from older and simpler models. More advanced 
models tend to confirm market efficiency but older ones may be 
prone to reject it. In general, it seems that commodity, energy, and 
even power markets are not especially efficient (STEM, 2006). 
4. Definition of the ex-post forward risk premium 
The present research is focused on the analysis of the Forward 
Risk Premium in the Iberian Power Futures Market comparing 
different settlement price criteria and comparing the magnitudes 
of such risk premium with other European Power Markets and 
even other fuel markets of interest. There are some studies 
regarding market efficiency based on the evaluation of Forward 
Risk Premium. Some of those studies are based on theoretical "ex-
ante" analysis by modelling-forecasted spot prices. Other studies 
use empirical data and evaluate "ex-post" the differences between 
the futures and spot prices. This research represents an empirical 
analysis using the "ex-post" Forward Risk Premium. 
The "ex-ante" Forward Risk Premium ("¿lex-ante") c a n be 
mathematically expressed as follows: 
¿lex-ante = F t j — Ft (ST) (1 ) 
where Ft,T refers to the futures power price observed on day "t" for 
delivery over period "T", and Ft(ST) refers to expected spot price on 
day "t" for delivery over period "T". 
The "ex-post" Forward Risk Premium ("/lex-post") can be 
mathematically expressed as follows: 
¿lex-post = Ft,T - Average(ST) (2) 
where average (ST) refers to average spot price for delivery over 
period T. 
In this research, the considered futures contracts are base load 
and with monthly and quarterly maturity. Three European Power 
Markets are considered, with all their prices in €/MWh: OMIP 
(Iberian Market), Powernext (French Market), and Nord Pool 
(Nordic Market). The considered fuel markets correspond to oil 
(Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Brent futures; only monthly 
futures are analysed, expressed in US$/Bbl), natural gas (ICE 
monthly futures and over the counter quarterly Platts' assess-
ments, all related to the British National Balancing Point (NBP), 
and expressed in GB pence/therm), and coal (European Energy 
Exchange (EEX) Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) Coal Fu-
tures, related to the underlying Argus McCloskey weekly spot 
index, expressed in US$/t). 
As different monetary units and energy units are used (original 
units for each market), Forward Risk Premium expressed in 
percentage over the futures price is preferred when comparing all 
these markets. Such an expression is mathematically written as 
follows (e.g., Furió and Meneu, 2009): 
¿•ex-post% — [F tJ - Average(ST)]/FtJ (3) 
The selected period for the study corresponds to the first two 
years of existence of OMIP market, which started on 3rd July, 
2006. Therefore, the monthly contracts span from August 2006 to 
July 2008, and the quarterly ones from Q4-06 to Q2-08. 
5. Test 1: assessment of OMIP auction equilibrium prices 
5.2. Test Í methodology 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Spanish local distribu-
tion companies (and the Portuguese last resort supplier) are 
obliged to purchase during the second half of year 2006 5% of 
their regulated power supplies (10% from year 2007 onwards) in 
OMIP call auctions. If they do not comply with such obligations, 
each national regulation establishes different penalties. Due to 
that fact, those companies are satisfactorily purchasing their 
required amounts in all the OMIP call auctions. According to the 
legislation mentioned in the Introduction ("Orders ITC"), the cost 
of the energy purchased by the Spanish distribution companies in 
the OMIP call auctions is recognised through the resulting 
equilibrium price of each call auction. 
Since the start of OMIP (in terms of quarterly periods, from 
Q4-06), all the auctioned settled contracts have experienced 
positive Forward Risk Premia until October 2007 (in terms of 
quarterly periods, until Q4-07), when a trend change is appre-
ciated and negative risk premia become dominant during quarters 
Q4-07 and Ql-08. The Forward Risk Premium is again positive 
along Q2-08, as shown in Fig. 2. 
Due to the scarce alternation of different signs of the Forward 
Risk Premium, Test 1 considers two periods ("positive" premia 
and "negative" premia) in order to assess for each period the cost 
of the purchased energy by distribution companies. Test 1 is also 
completed with another test in which monthly contracts are 
separately considered from quarterly contracts. In both tests, 3 
different reference prices are employed. 
Resulting auction equilibrium price ("Feq"): this is the price 
recognised to the distribution companies, as stated above. It is 
calculated as the weighted average price of all the volumes 
acquired by the distribution companies in the call auctions 
celebrated for each futures contract. 
Average futures price for all the quotation period ("Fau"): this is 
the average price of all the daily settlement prices published by 
OMIP along the whole quotation period of the futures contract. 
The algorithm employed by OMIP for determining the daily 
settlement price, based on the traded prices and the bid-ask 
spread, is described in Section C.6 (settlement price calcula-
tion) of OMIP OMIClear Operational Guide (version of 
June 2008). OMIP is the market operator and OMIClear 
is the clearinghouse. The algorithm can be summarised as 
follows: 
The settlement price for a futures contract is the last traded 
price if it is within the closing bid-ask spread. 
If the last traded price during the trading session is not 
situated in the closing bid-ask spread, the settlement price is 
the bid or ask price closest to the last traded price. 
If there is no traded price during the trading session, the 
settlement price is the average of the bid-ask corresponding to 
the closing spread. 
If there is no traded price during the trading session, and no 
closing bid-ask spread, the settlement price corresponds to the 
settlement price of the previous trading session 
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OMIP Risk Premia (Avge FM-AvgeSde|iv)/AvgeFM % 
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Fig. 3. OMIP risk premia in different quotation periods with different reference prices. 
• Nonetheless, when OMIP does not rely on the resulting price 
due to scarce negotiation of the contract, OMIP consults a Price 
Committee and the daily price is obtained from representative 
quotations of the OTC market. Additionally, OMIP often 
employs the arbitrage criterion between a quarterly contract 
and their comprised monthly ones, to obtain the settlement 
prices by using weighted averages among these 4 contracts. It 
also applies arbitrage criterion between a calendar contract 
and their comprised quarterly ones. This is due to the fact that 
as other forward market mechanisms coexist with OMIP call 
auctions (OTC, EPE auctions, and CESUR auctions, as previously 
described in Section 2 Iberian power futures market), the most 
traded contracts in OMIP are the prompt months and quarterly 
ones (quarterly contracts with the same maturity as those from 
EPE and CESUR auctions), being the settlement prices of the 
least traded contracts in OMIP obtained through this arbitrage 
criterion. 
• Average Spot price ("S"): this is the average price resulting from 
the Spanish Power Pool day-ahead prices and corresponding to 
the whole delivery period of the considered futures contract. This 
Power Pool is managed by OMIE (market operator of the Iberian 
Energy Market, Spanish Pool, known traditionally as "OMEL"). 
5.2. Test 2 results 
Fig. 3 shows the evolution of /dex-post% according to the three 
reference prices stated in the methodology and the two quotation 
periods considered. 
Table 1 shows the economic results for each of the two 
observed periods for the Forward Risk Premium and the total 
values according to the three reference prices. 
From Fig. 3 and Table 1 it can be observed that Fall provides 
smaller economic values both for the positive and negative premia 
periods than the official recognised price (Feq). Therefore, the total 
economic costs do differ depending on which futures price is 
considered as reference. For the considered data set, the total 
economic cost of the difference between the reference future price 
and the spot price Feq-spot (74,318,226 €) is 31% bigger than Fau-
spot (56.,32,202€). Additionally, from Fig. 3 it is shown that 
Forward Risk Premium with Fall is less than Forward Risk Premium 
with Feq along year 2008. 
Another analysis is performed for the total economic costs by 
distinguishing per contract type (monthly versus quarterly), as 
shown in Table 2. From Table 2, it is shown that the costs of 
monthly contracts are 2,9% higher considering the official 
recognised price (Feq) instead of the average quotation price 
(fan)- Nonetheless, for the quarterly contracts, the costs with Feq 
are less (-0.7%). Such a difference in the costs show that there 
may be more competitive pressure in OMIP call auctions for the 
quarterly contracts than for the monthly ones. This can be 
provoked by the interaction with the other coexisting MIBEL 
market mechanisms (EPE and CESUR auctions) where quarterly 
contracts are also traded. However, this claim is not as strong as 
Feq has resulted bigger than Fau for the already expired quarterly 
contracts of year 2008 (Ql-08 and Q2-08). The results for the 
next two quarters (Q3-08 and Q4-08) will reinforce or reject this 
hypothesis about the competitive nature of OMIP quarterly call 
auctions. 
On the other hand, t-Student tests, separately done for monthly 
and quarterly futures, considering two tails and heteroskedasti-
city, show no evidence (test result provides a probability value of 
62.6% for monthly futures and 84.3% for quarterly futures) for 
assuming same average values for Fall and Feq. 
Fig. 4 shows the evolution of Feq and Fall for the quarterly 
contracts. Additionally, it shows the evolution of weighted 
averages of the underlying monthly average spot prices ("OMIE", 
also known as "OMEL") for each quarterly delivery period. The 
conclusions obtained from Fig. 3, Tables 1 and 2 are also found in 
this figure. Furthermore, comparison with the weighted averages 
of the monthly contracts is provided (F*eq and F*au). It can be 
appreciated that F*eq and F*all are smaller than Feq and Fall, 
respectively, until the end of year 2007, but during year 2008 the 
situation is reversed. The spread between Feq and F*eq is smaller 
than between Fall and F*all. Additionally, the spread between F*eq 
and F*aii is smaller than between Feq and Fau. 
From the results obtained, the following conclusions can be 
drawn: 
• In the short term, until enough liquidity is reached in OMIP 
continuous market, it seems reasonable to continue arranging 
compulsory call auctions for the Spanish Distribution Compa-
nies. Nonetheless, the equilibrium price (Feq), used for the 
settlement of the purchased contracts, is resulting slightly 
higher compared to the average of settlement prices along the 
trading period of the contract (Fau). According to OMIP trading 
limits for mitigating the members' credit risk - as theoretically 
defined in Section B2.12 Daily Price Variation Limits of OMIP 
Operational Guide and practically specified in (OMIP, Notice 
04/2006) regarding maximum price variation limits - accepted 
bids and offers must be contained within an interval centered 
on the trading session reference price, i.e., the resulting 
settlement price of the previous session. In case of yearly and 
quarterly contracts, the interval spans from the reference price 
+ 6% (+ 9% for monthly contracts; +15% for weekly contracts). 
Spanish distribution companies and Portuguese last resort 
supplier submit their compulsory bids in OMIP call auctions at 
the price given by the upper limit of the interval, in order to 
ensure that their bids are matched. If they submitted their bids 
at a maximum price which is somehow less, the resulting 
equilibrium price might diminish, as desired in terms of 
economic costs to the regulated supplies. Therefore, it makes 
sense that as soon as the settlement price of the previous 
Table 1 
Costs assessment of energy purchased in OMIP call auctions by Spanish distribution companies. 
Costs assessment of energy purchased in OMIP auctions by Spanish distribution companies 
Period MWh efall efet e Spot 
Positive forward risk premium: July 2006-September 2007 and April 2008-July 2008 (Q4-06-Q3-07 and Q2-Q8) 14,097,571 734,626,089 748,536,130 629,181,275 
Negative forward risk premium: October 2007-March 2008 (Q4-07-OJ -08) 7,677,216 387,684,679 391,360,662 436,397,291 
Total 21,774,787 1,122,310,768 1,139,896,792 1,065,578,566 
Distinction per forward risk premium nature. 
Source: OMIP and OMIE. 
Table 2 
Costs assessment of energy purchased in OMIP call auctions by Spanish distribution companies. 
Costs assessment of 
Contract type 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Total 
energy purchased in OMIP auctions 
MWh 
13,896,691 
7,878,096 
21,774,787 
by Spanish distribution companies 
«Fall 
722,027,227 
400,283,541 
1,122,310,768 
f F 
742,311,612 
397,585,180 
1,139,896,792 
e Spot 
680,792,606 
384,785,960 
1,065,578,566 
Distinction per contract type. 
Source: OMIP and OMIE. 
OMIP Settlement Prices Comparison: Quarterly contracts versus Weighted 
Average Monthly Contracts (*) and underlying spot prices (OMEL) 
65 
60 
55 
? 50 
45 
40 
35 
• * - . _ / 
CD 
O 
1 -
a CO 
O 
5 
CD 
O 
CN 
a CO 
O 
CO 
a CO 
O 
1 -
a CO 
00 
O 
5 
CD 
00 
O 
CN 
a CO 
-Fall- -o- Fall*-»-Feq- a- Feq*—X- OMEL 
Fig. 4. Comparison of OMIP settlement prices: quarterly contracts versus weighted average monthly contracts (*) and underlying spot prices (OMEL). 
session is determined, OMIP and MIBEL Regulators Committee 
may agree upon a cap price for the compulsory call auction of 
the following day. Such a cap price would be carefully 
calculated per auction, in order to get the desired effect on 
the auction equilibrium price without preventing competition 
on the sales curve. The cap price would only apply for the 
compulsory call auction, not for the continuous market. For the 
sake of transparency, the auction cap price should be published 
in OMIP bulletin together with the results of the trading 
session previous to the compulsory call auction. This daily 
bulletin shows, per negotiated futures contract, all the traded 
volumes in OMIP continuous market, compulsory call auctions, 
and OTC settled by OMIClear. Furthermore, last traded price, 
open price, daily high and low prices, closing bid-ask spread, 
aggregated traded volumes distinguishing between financial 
and physical settled contracts (excluding OTC settled by 
OMIClear), and open interest are also shown. 
It may be reasonable to continue offering compulsory 
quantities via OMIP call auctions to distribution companies 
(substituted by last resort suppliers in the coming future) until 
desired liquidity levels are reached in the continuous market. 
At that stage, the settlement price published by OMIP should 
accurately reflect market prices and could be better utilised for 
the calculation of last resort supply costs. The last resort 
suppliers would then be able to cover their forward energy 
needs through OMIP continuous market. Therefore, further 
compulsory OMIP call auctions would no longer be necessary. 
Additionally, the competitive nature of the continuous market 
would theoretically provide fewer prices than compulsory 
auctions, making the supply costs more affordable to last 
resort suppliers. 
6. Test 2: analysis of basic statistics of futures and spot prices 
6.2. Test 2 methodology 
Basic statistics (average, median, maximum, minimum, stan-
dard deviation, asymmetry coefficient, and kurtosis) for the 
monthly and quarterly futures contracts and their underlying 
average spot prices are provided in order to compare all the 
energy markets considered. The data set is comprised of the 
arithmetical mean values for the settlement prices of each futures 
contract during its quotation period. For the corresponding spot 
price, arithmetical mean for the underlying delivery period is 
calculated. 
6.2. Test 2 results 
Tables 3 and 4 show basic statistics for the monthly and 
quarterly futures prices, respectively: From the information 
reflected in the tables, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
• In general, asymmetry tends to be positive and kurtosis tends 
to be negative. 
• Although not reflected in the tables, similar results (except for 
asymmetry of quarterly contracts) are obtained from OMIP Feq 
as those shown for OMIP Fall. 
Within each market and comparing futures with spot values, 
the same behaviour is detected for monthly and quarterly 
contracts, except for asymmetry and kurtosis. Nevertheless, as 
the data set is quite limited (especially for quarterly contracts), 
such differences are not relevant. 
The average risk premia are positive in power and gas markets, 
but negative in oil and coal markets. To be more precise, in 
power and gas markets the average risk premia of positive 
values tend to be bigger in absolute value than average risk 
premia of negative values. In oil and coal markets, the average 
risk premia of negative values tend to be bigger in absolute 
value than average risk premia of positive values. 
According to standard deviation values, spot markets show 
bigger volatility than their related futures markets, except for 
gas market. Due to that bigger volatility, more extreme values 
are presented in spot markets, with the exceptions of 
maximum values in gas forward market and minimum values 
in oil and coal futures markets. The biggest spreads (futures 
versus spot) regarding maximum values are produced for the 
oil and coal markets. 
7. Test 3: analysis of zlex-Post% magnitudes 
7.2. Test 3.Í: assessment of forward risk premium existence 
7.Í.Í. Test 3.Í methodology 
For all the markets considered, distinguishing between 
monthly and quarterly futures contracts (Faii). a t-Student test is 
performed to detect, for each market, if the positive A ex-post% and 
the negative /dex-post% have the same average value (i.e., if the risk 
premium tends to 0, there would not be evidence of its existence). 
The t-Student test is done considering two tails and hetero-
skedasticity. 
7.2.2. Test 3.2 results 
t-Student tests performed for each market (except for EEX ARA 
Coal where all the Forward Risk Premia are negative for every 
month in both monthly and quarterly contracts), and distinguish-
ing between monthly and quarterly contracts, render extremely 
low probability values rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
Table 3 
Basic statistics of Fau and underlying spot prices of monthly futures contracts during period August 2006-July 2008. 
Average 
Median 
Max 
Min 
Std. Dev. 
Asymmetry 
Kurtosis 
Basic statistics of average reference 
OMIP (e/MWh) 
Futures 
51.74 
53.02 
67.16 
38.35 
8.29 
-0.21 
-1.01 
Spot 
46.82 
45.06 
70.22 
29.68 
12.36 
0.56 
-0.96 
Powernext 
Futures 
54.61 
54.77 
82.89 
27.87 
15.95 
0.03 
-0.93 
prices of monthly contracts and underlying spot prices. 
: (e/MWh) 
Spot 
47.97 
42.55 
88.33 
27.02 
18.61 
0.50 
-1.08 
Nord Pool 
Futures 
43.45 
44.81 
63.17 
23.77 
12.42 
-0.01 
-1.15 
(e/MWh) 
Spot 
35.94 
34.91 
66.48 
16.53 
13.73 
0.63 
-0.23 
NBP(GB 
Futures 
47.76 
43.75 
80.08 
26.48 
15.69 
0.71 
-0.11 
. period: 
p/therm) 
Spot 
37.99 
33.86 
62.18 
16.24 
15.35 
0.27 
-1.45 
August 2006--July 2008 
Brent (US $/Bbl) 
Futures 
64.81 
63.25 
77.64 
51.02 
6.16 
0.12 
0.31 
Spot 
82.20 
74.99 
133.18 
53.91 
23.76 
0.92 
-0.08 
EEX ARA 
Futures 
87.02 
71.86 
154.32 
62.63 
26.66 
1.15 
0.21 
(US $/t) 
Spot 
103.87 
82.34 
209.73 
65.70 
41.59 
1.01 
0.19 
Source: OMIP, OMIE, Powernext, Nord Pool, EEX, Platts, Argus McCloskey. 
Table 4 
Basic statistics of Fall and underlying spot prices of quarterly futures contracts during period Q4.2006-Q2-2008. 
Average 
Median 
Max 
Min 
Std.Dev. 
Asymmetry 
Kurtosis 
Basic statistics 
OMIP (e/MWh) 
Futures 
51.86 
50.31 
58.57 
46.57 
4.36 
0.55 
-1.05 
average 
Spot 
45.58 
39 
65.86 
35.70 
11.83 
1.02 
-0.42 
reference prices quarterly contracts and underlying spot prices. 
Powernext (e/MWh) 
Futures 
54.69 
51.09 
70.06 
41.08 
11.56 
0.25 
-1.97 
Spot 
47.87 
41.72 
72.71 
29.35 
19.05 
0.30 
-2.38 
Nord Pool 
Futures 
40.26 
38.80 
48.72 
33.34 
5.48 
0.51 
-0.78 
(e/MWh) 
Spot 
32.73 
34.61 
44.60 
19.74 
9.91 
-0.14 
-1.87 
period: Q4-06--Q2-08 
NBP (GB p/therm) 
Futures 
49.41 
41.46 
76.11 
30.36 
16.86 
0.86 
-0.72 
Spot 
37.64 
30.53 
60.58 
20.20 
15.79 
0.40 
-1.70 
EEX ARA 
Futures 
73.01 
69.51 
86.85 
66.14 
7.65 
1.21 
0.40 
(US $/t) 
Spot 
102.32 
86.02 
158.63 
67.39 
37.01 
0.59 
-1.63 
Source: OMIP, OMIE, Powernext, Nord Pool, EEX, Platts, Argus McCloskey. 
existence (or "zero-value") for the Forward Risk Premium. There-
fore, the results of the test justify the existence of positive and 
negative Forward Risk Premia. Table 5 shows the insignificant 
probability values. 
7.2. Test 3.2: comparison of futures behaviour towards maturity 
• Correlation between futures series (Fan versus FM-3. FM-2» 
orFM_-i). 
• Samuelson's hypothesis (1965): "Volatility increases as Futures 
contracts approach maturity". 
• Increasing convergence to spot price (less Aex_posa in absolute 
value) with maturity. 
7.2.2. Test 3.2 methodology 
For all the markets considered, distinguishing between 
monthly and quarterly futures contracts, and per approach to 
maturity (all quotation period ("Fau"), 3rd last month of quotation 
("FM_3"), 2nd last month of quotation ("FM_2"), and last month of 
quotation ("FM-i")), different magnitudes are compared: 
• Assessment of similar behaviour between monthly and 
quarterly contracts. 
• Quantitative comparison of Aex_posa between monthly and 
quarterly contracts. 
• Quantitative comparison of /dex-post% between periods with 
positive or negative values. 
Table 5 
t-Student test regarding null hypothesis of no existence ("zero-value") for the 
forward risk premium. 
t-Student test, null hypothesis: "zero" forward risk premium 
OMIP Powernext Nord Pool NBP Brent 
Puionthiy 0.00068026 0.00082985 0.00000032 0.00000002 0.00000014 
Pquarteriy 0.00216445 0.00068821 0.00078747 0.00248197 n.a. 
Source: OMIP, OMIE, Powernext, Nord Pool, Platts. 
7.2.2. Test 3.2 results 
Fig. 5 shows the evolution of the Forward Risk Premia (in 
percentage) for both monthly and quarterly OMIP futures 
contracts, considering the 4 series of futures prices: Fau, FM-3, 
FM_2, and FM_! Figs. 6-10, respectively, show the equivalent 
information for the rest of considered energy markets in this 
research, namely: Powernext, Nord Pool, NBP Gas, Brent, and EEX 
ARA Coal. 
By analysing all these charts, various trends are detected. The 
following conclusions can be drawn from Figs. 5-10: 
• Monthly and quarterly contracts have similar Forward Risk 
Premium variation trends coinciding with alternant periods of 
positive zlex-post% or negative zlex-post%. In case of power 
markets, a general trend change ("positive to negative") is 
produced in autumn 2007. 
• Quantitative variations of Aex_posa are similar for monthly and 
quarterly contracts. Whereas monthly average values tend to 
be slightly smaller than quarterly ones, extreme monthly 
values tend to be somewhat bigger than quarterly ones, 
explained by slightly bigger volatility of the monthly values 
(measured in terms of standard deviation). Regarding extreme 
variations, the smallest ones occur for OMIP (around +40%), 
and the biggest for NBP (around + 80%). 
OMIP Risk Premia (Avg FM-AvgeSde| iv)/AvgeFM % 
for Monthly Contracts in different quotation periods 
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Fig. 5. OMIP Forward Risk Premia distinguishing reference prices per approach to maturity. 
Powernext Risk Premia (AvgeFu/i-AvgeSdeüvyAvgeFu/i % 
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Fig. 6. Powernext Forward Risk Premia distinguishing reference prices per approach to maturity. 
Nord Pool Risk Premia (AvgeFM-AvgeSd6Mv)/AvgeFM % 
for Monthly Contracts in different quotation periods 
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Fig. 7. Nord Pool Forward Risk Premia distinguishing reference prices per approach to maturity. 
• Whereas A 
markets, A 
ex-post% 
ex-post% 
positive is dominant in power and gas 
 negative is dominant in oil and coal markets, 
supposing different hedging strategies within each market. In 
absolute value, positive Aex_post % tends to be slightly bigger 
than negative zlex-Post%-
• Correlation between futures series (Fau with each of the 3 
series FM_3, FM_2, or FM.i) - analysing separately monthly and 
quarterly futures contracts - is only significant in EEX ARA Coal 
(correlation coefficient around 0.99). In case of power markets, 
for the monthly contracts the correlation coefficients are 
NBP Gas Risk Premia (AvgeFM-AvgeSdeMv)/AvgeFM % 
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Fig. 8. NBP Gas Forward Risk Premia distinguishing reference prices per approach to maturity. 
Brent Risk Premia (AvgeFM-AvgeSdeMv)/AvgeFM % for 
Monthly Contracts in different quotation periods 
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Fig. 9. Brent Forward Risk Premia distinguishing reference prices per approach to maturity. 
around 0.90 and for the quarterly contracts, the correlation 
coefficients are around 0.60. Smaller coefficients for quarterly 
contracts can be caused by the limited data set (7 values) 
compared to wider monthly data set (24 values). Comparing 
power markets, Powernext presents the biggest correlation 
coefficients and Nord Pool the smallest ones. For NBP Gas, 
correlation coefficients are around 0.70 for monthly and 
quarterly contracts. For Brent, correlation coefficients are 
around 0.85 (monthly contracts). For all the markets, the least 
correlation is produced between Fall and FM_i (i.e., correlation 
tends to diminish as futures contracts approach maturity). 
Samuelson's maturity effect (increasing volatility when ma-
turity approaches) is only noticeable in OMIP, Powernext, EEX 
ARA Coal, and Brent. 
Increasing convergence to spot price with maturity is fulfilled 
by all time series (trend towards smallest A ex-post% in absolute 
value, when comparing, in this sequence, FM-3, FM-2, and FM-I). 
Monthly and quarterly contracts are analysed separately, 
where comparison of zlex-post% in absolute value is separately 
done for positive /dex-post% and negative /dex-post%- The conver-
gence with maturity can be caused due to lack of accuracy in 
oldest quoted futures prices. 
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Fig. 10. EEX ARA Coal Forward Risk Premia distinguishing reference prices per approach to maturity. 
8. Test 4: Bessembinder's and Lemmon's hypothesis 
compliance 
8.2. Test 4 methodology 
For each futures contract type (monthly and quarterly, distin-
guishing between Fall, FM_3, FM_2, FM-I) of the three considered 
European Power Markets, testable hypothesis from Bessembinder 
and Lemmon (2002) is checked by using Ae as the power 
prices in the 3 markets are commonly expressed in €/MWh: 
¿lex-post = Ft,T - Average(ST) (4) 
The testable hypothesis is as follows: 
"The Forward Risk Premium decreases in the variance of spot 
prices and increases in the skewness of wholesale prices". In order 
to test the hypothesis, linear regression is applied according to: 
^ex-post = a + jS*VAR(ST) + y*ASIM(ST) + sT (5) 
where a is a constant, fl and y are coefficients, VAR(ST) reflects the 
variance of spot prices, ASIM(ST) represents the non-standardised 
asymmetry coefficient ("skewness") of spot prices (it is the 
asymmetry coefficient multiplied by cubed standard deviation of 
spot prices), and eT is an error term. 
Good compliance should render negative /?, positive y, with 
significant values for their t-statistics, as well as a high value of R-
squared statistic. For the t-Student tests, a level of confidence of 
95% with 2 tails is considered. 
8.2. Test 4 results 
Table 6 summarises the results of applying multifactor linear 
regression: 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the results 
summarised in Table 6: 
• In general, there is relatively poor compliance for the three 
power markets. No significant differences are obtained be-
tween the four Futures series considered within each market. 
In the case of OMIP, similar results are also obtained by using 
Feq instead of Fall. Although the quarterly contracts are 
composed of a limited data set per serie (7 values versus 24 
of the monthly contracts), R-squared statistic is larger for the 
quarterly contracts. 
• OMIP is the least compliant market, as for both monthly and 
quarterly contracts, coefficient signs for p and y are not right as 
expected from the testable hypothesis, R-squared statistic 
results too low, and t-Student tests (significant values for the 
coefficients) are not satisfactory. 
• Powernext is the best compliant market, as coefficient signs 
are right, R-squared statistic renders reasonable level, and t-
Student tests are partly satisfactory. 
• Nord Pool has a medium compliance, as the coefficient signs 
tend to be right, and t-Student tests are partly satisfactory. 
Reasonable values for R-squared statistic are only found for the 
quarterly contracts. 
9. Conclusions 
Market efficiency is analysed for the Iberian Power Futures 
Markets and other European Power Markets (Powernext and Nord 
Pool), and fuel markets (Brent, NBP Natural Gas, and EEX ARA 
Coal) through evaluation of ex-post Forward Risk Premium. The 
equilibrium price in OMIP compulsory call auctions for distribu-
tion companies is not optimal for remuneration purposes as the 
purchasing costs for regulated supplies tend to be slightly higher 
than those from OMIP average settlement prices along the whole 
quotation period. A regulated cap price for each OMIP compulsory 
call auction could be transitorily applied in order to obtain a lower 
equilibrium price and therefore diminish regulated costs of 
supply. Once OMIP continuous market has acceptable liquidity, 
the settlement price itself would reflect more accurately the 
market prices and could be used for evaluating the cost of last 
resort supplies. In the period considered (August 2006-July 2008), 
monthly futures contracts have a similar behaviour as quarterly 
Table 6 
Regression results regarding compliance with Bessembinder's and Lemmon's hypothesis. 
Bessembinder's and Lemmon's hypothesis 
Quot. period 
OMIP M contracts 
All 
M-3 
M-2 
M-l 
OMIP Q contracts 
All 
M-3 
M-2 
M-l 
Powernext M contracts 
All 
M-3 
M-2 
M-l 
Powernext Q contracts 
All 
M-3 
M-2 
M-l 
Nord Pool M contracts 
All 
M-3 
M-2 
M-l 
Nord Pool Q contracts 
All 
M-3 
M-2 
M-l 
a 
4.75 
5.38 
5.84 
3.63 
5.83 
7.28 
6.50 
4.51 
18.32 
22.50 
19.53 
12.60 
29.66 
27.34 
27.74 
20.48 
13.24 
12.99 
10.90 
6.04 
16.82 
13.61 
4.78 
-0.18 
compliance for ex-post forward risk 
P 
0.0177 
-0.0056 
-0.0386 
0.0358 
-0.0373 
-0.0943 
0.0316 
0.1223 
-0.0637 
-0.0890 
-0.0669 
-0.0337 
-0.1547 
-0.1211 
-0.1131 
-0.0796 
-0.2662 
-0.2712 
-0.2520 
-0.1224 
-0.2115 
0.0424 
0.2855 
0.3524 
y 
-0.0034 
0.0005 
0.0009 
-0.0060 
0.0105 
0.0116 
-0.0098 
-0.0268 
0.0003 
0.0004 
0.0003 
0.0001 
0.0010 
0.0007 
0.0006 
0.0004 
0.0092 
0.0153 
0.0022 
-0.0091 
-0.0078 
0.0283 
0.0642 
0.0783 
premium in power 
R2(%) 
0.07 
0.00 
0.48 
0.47 
1.95 
1.00 
2.58 
14.48 
60.13 
64.79 
59.39 
44.99 
75.36 
69.98 
69.48 
68.58 
15.02 
10.41 
15.68 
12.65 
43.96 
9.51 
45.35 
82.26 
markets 
t 
2.08 
2.09 
2.09 
2.08 
2.78 
2.78 
2.78 
2.78 
2.08 
2.08 
2.08 
2.08 
2.78 
2.78 
2.78 
2.78 
2.08 
2.08 
2.08 
2.08 
2.78 
2.78 
2.78 
2.78 
t« 
1.34 
1.23 
1.66 
1.49 
0.48 
0.62 
0.62 
0.51 
5.28 
5.83 
5.13 
3.81 
3.39 
2.74 
2.66 
2.24 
3.35 
2.61 
2.96 
2.69 
2.67 
1.14 
0.59 
- .04 
t/> 
0.10 
-0.02 
-0.21 
0.28 
-0.08 
-0.20 
0.08 
0.34 
-3.67 
-4.61 
-3.51 
-2.04 
-2.62 
-1.80 
-1.61 
-1.29 
-1.93 
-1.56 
-1.96 
-1.56 
-1.41 
0.15 
1.47 
3.52 
Ty 
-0.12 
0.01 
0.03 
-0.31 
0.17 
0.19 
-0.18 
-0.58 
2.54 
3.47 
2.37 
1.11 
2.18 
1.35 
1.15 
0.82 
0.28 
0.37 
0.07 
-0.49 
-0.28 
0.54 
1.81 
4.26 
Source: OMIP, OMIE, Powernext, and Nord Pool. 
contracts and average risk premia have been positive in power 
markets (especially until Q4-07) and in gas markets but negative 
in oil and coal markets. In all the examined markets, the Forward 
Risk Premium for a futures contract tends to diminish as it 
approaches maturity. Samuelson's maturity effect (increasing 
volatility with maturity) is only noticeable in OMIP, Powernext, 
EEX ARA Coal, and Brent. Compliance with Bessembinder's and 
Lemmon's testable hypothesis regarding Forward Risk Premium 
variations in power markets (decreasing with variance of spot 
prices, and increasing with skewness of spot prices) is relatively 
low. Further research is proposed considering an enlarged data set 
(especially with quarterly contracts) to better test all the 
hypotheses and draw additional conclusions. Inclusion of longer 
contracts (synthetic joint of two quarters, and calendar contracts) 
may also be of interest, although such series are still reduced if 
OMIP starting point Quly 2006) is considered. In general, it can be 
concluded that none of the markets analysed presents a notice-
able level of market efficiency as remarkable Forward Risk Premia 
exist in all the markets. Regarding power markets, the behaviour 
of OMIP futures prices do not differ much in terms of efficiency 
compared to more mature markets (Powernext and Nord Pool). 
Although liquidity is still poor in the Iberian Derivatives Market 
managed by OMIP, its price efficiency has improved along with 
OMIP market development and should further increase with 
upcoming integration of European Power Regional Markets as 
well as with the development of the coexisting forward contract-
ing mechanisms in the Iberian Energy Market, namely, OTC, EPE 
auctions, and CESUR auctions. Additionally, due to the relevance 
of natural gas as power-generation fuel within the Iberian energy 
mix, further development of the Iberian Natural Gas Market (the 
so-called MIBGAS) will presumably contribute to indirectly 
improve the desired OMIP price efficiency. Further research is 
encouraged to analyse the efficiency gains of the Iberian 
Derivatives Market caused by the dynamic evolution of the 
Iberian energy markets. 
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